Again, I would like to emphasize HOW phenomenon is shaped.
It seems that other animals do not concern the flowing water as humans would do. Not only both (human and animal) have developed different physiological ways of incorporating information of the world. It is not just depended solely on any physiological, or "bodily", function of the being. It is only a recent assumption that there is entirely abstract "data", clearly distinguished from other fluid environment, that can be scripted into any material and considered comprehensively or incomprehensively through scientific method. No.
We do not have any positive proof of there is such a distinction (of the material and the immaterial). This assumption is the whole basis of structuralism in its broadest term. If we assume such a fundamental distinction of the world then we again would have to face an awkward situation in which we need a "bridge" connecting between those two: This of course have founded the unnecessary discussion between Nominalism and Realism.
Put simply, if you say, "everybody has its own way to understand the world" then it is a replication of the basic structuralism. There, in reality, cannot be such a distinction between "understand" and "the world". Fixing the two opposite parts is a very humanist trait, therefore someone might say "human is structuralist."
Once I dropped a bit of water when I was drinking. As the water dropping to between my legs, I almost automatically stretched my legs as it dropped down to the floor. It was successful! Successful in matching the speed of the acceleration of gravity of the water with that of my legs.
If "time" can be considered by thinking "speed", both also be matters of phenomenology. It is because time cannot exist without being, as Heidegger defines. The falling water is a being-in-the-same-world with my being. The fact of falling, the fact of its being of water becomes for the first time a fact by being with, connecting to, my body drinking the water, my hand holding the cup, my legs reacting to the water almost automatically, my consciousness almost unconscious at that time, and so on.
The reason I was stammering with, in particular, the division of life and its surrounding world is to conjecture the "boundary" of phenomenon. My hypothesis on shaping phenomenon is: Life defines phenomenon, since life has the function of "crystalization of time".
It seems that other animals do not concern the flowing water as humans would do. Not only both (human and animal) have developed different physiological ways of incorporating information of the world. It is not just depended solely on any physiological, or "bodily", function of the being. It is only a recent assumption that there is entirely abstract "data", clearly distinguished from other fluid environment, that can be scripted into any material and considered comprehensively or incomprehensively through scientific method. No.
We do not have any positive proof of there is such a distinction (of the material and the immaterial). This assumption is the whole basis of structuralism in its broadest term. If we assume such a fundamental distinction of the world then we again would have to face an awkward situation in which we need a "bridge" connecting between those two: This of course have founded the unnecessary discussion between Nominalism and Realism.
Put simply, if you say, "everybody has its own way to understand the world" then it is a replication of the basic structuralism. There, in reality, cannot be such a distinction between "understand" and "the world". Fixing the two opposite parts is a very humanist trait, therefore someone might say "human is structuralist."
Once I dropped a bit of water when I was drinking. As the water dropping to between my legs, I almost automatically stretched my legs as it dropped down to the floor. It was successful! Successful in matching the speed of the acceleration of gravity of the water with that of my legs.
If "time" can be considered by thinking "speed", both also be matters of phenomenology. It is because time cannot exist without being, as Heidegger defines. The falling water is a being-in-the-same-world with my being. The fact of falling, the fact of its being of water becomes for the first time a fact by being with, connecting to, my body drinking the water, my hand holding the cup, my legs reacting to the water almost automatically, my consciousness almost unconscious at that time, and so on.
The reason I was stammering with, in particular, the division of life and its surrounding world is to conjecture the "boundary" of phenomenon. My hypothesis on shaping phenomenon is: Life defines phenomenon, since life has the function of "crystalization of time".
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